Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records:
Judicial Response

On August 10, 1965, Dale Menard was taken into custody by the Los
Angeles Police Department on a charge of burglary.1 He was held two
days without a hearing and then released, the police being satisfied that
"there [was] no ground for making a criminal complaint against the
person arrested. ' 2 Under a California statute the arrest was classified
as "detention only." However, the record of his arrest, including fingerprints, had been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which incorporated it into criminal identification files.3 Menard filed
a complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia alleging
that he was arrested without probable cause and seeking to compel the
Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI to
remove his fingerprints and accompanying notation from the Bureau's
files. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in an
opinion by Judge Bazelon stating that the FBI's authority to retain
and disseminate Menard's record was not without limit. The court
nevertheless remanded the case for trial, declaring that the issues presented required a more complete factual development before a final
decision could be reached. 4
Full resolution of the legal issues presented by Menard v. Mitchell
could have a substantial impact on the present system of criminal justice in the United States. The practice of taking fingerprints, photographs, and other identification data of every person arrested by local,
state, and federal law enforcement officers and disseminating that
data at their discretion prior to final disposition of the case is well
I Menard

v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 488 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2 Id. at 488.
3 Id. at 487.
4 Id. at 494. On remand, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
FBI's authority to disseminate arrest records outside the federal government was limited
to distribution to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes. The action
for expungement could not, however, be maintained until administrative remedies were
exhausted, and then Menard's first resort would be in the state courts. 39 U.S.L.W. 2725
(D.D.C. June 15, 1971).
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established.5 In fact, the collection 6 and immediate transmission 7 of
data to state and federal law enforcement agencies are often required
by statute. Even in the absence of statutory mandate, these procedures
are usually held to be well within the authority of police.8 After a dis5 The number of people affected by this practice is staggering. Although the total
number of individuals arrested in the United States is unknown, the FBI reported, on
the basis of returns representing 71% of the population, that in 1969 a total of 5,773,988
arrests were made. FEDERAL BuRAu OF INVEsTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNrrED STATEs: UNIFORM CRIlME REPORTs-1969, at 107-08 (1969). One study has estimated
that "about 40 percent of the male children living in the United States today will be
arrested for a nontraffic offense sometime in their lives." PRESIDENT'S COMMr'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT & ADMINIsTRATION OF JUsTICE, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
Faxx Socirry 247 (1967). The statistics do not reveal how many people arrested are not
convicted; however, the FBI reports may show a rough trend. Data covering a population exceeding 66 million showed that in 1969, of 2,402,979 persons charged, 15.9% or
382,074 were acquitted or had charges dismissed and 18.5% or 444,551 were referred
to juvenile courts. FEDRAL BuRaAu OF INvEsTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, supra, at 102.
Many more individuals would be included in the arrested but not convicted category
if figures existed for those, like Menard, who were arrested but not formally charged.
6 Local law enforcement officials are often under a statutory duty to take fingerprints,
photographs, and other identification information of all persons arrested for felonies,
persons reasonably suspected to be fugitives, "well known and habitual criminals," and
persons arrested for certain specified misdemeanors. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 30.81
(1969); ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-2 (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-857 (1970).
Some courts have extended the scope of statutory authorization to collection of identification data on all arrested persons, holding that statutory authority to maintain
records, at police discretion, of persons arrested for certain offenses implies the authority
to maintain records of all arrests, unless the statute specifically prohibits record keeping
in certain instances. See, e.g., United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D.
Ohio 1968); Poyer v. Boustead, 3 Ill. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954).
7 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8511 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 30.31(2) (1969);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206-3 (1970); INn. ANN. STAT. § 47-859 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 165.84 (1970).
8 United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio 1968); United States
v. Krapf, 180 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1961); United States
v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932); Shannon v. State, 207 Ark. 658, 182 S.W.2d 384 (1944);
Owensby v. Morris, 79 S.V.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). See also Annot., 83 A.L.R. 127
(1933). The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit these
practices. United States v. Laub Baking Co., supra; Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923
(9th Cir. 1966). If the arrest is lawful, the fourth amendment will not bar fingerprints
and photographs taken after arrest as evidence for trial. United States v. Laub Baking
Co., supra. The courts further hold that the invasion of privacy involved in taking the
fingerprints, photographs, and the making of the record is justified. See, e.g., Kolb v.
O'Connor, 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957).
Furthermore, dissemination of data before disposition of the case is usually upheld.
See Poyer v. Boustead, 3 Ill. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226
Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947); McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 NJ. Eq. 341, 54 A.2d 469
(Ch. 1947); Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). Many states also
authorize local police to establish, with the cooperation of the state identification bureau,
their own identification files in which data may be maintained. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 8514(l) (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-858 (1970).
Some courts declare that the taking and dissemination of arrest data before disposition
is justified because no stigma attaches to fingerprinting and photographing since the pro-
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position of the case is reached 9 the arrest data, often with notation of
subsequent processing of the individual through the criminal justice
system, are retained in local, state, and federal criminal identification
files or computer data banks. 10 If the arrest did not lead to a conviction,
the information retained constitutes what is called the "arrest record.""
Although these records are often declared confidential, they are widely
cedures are primarily for identification purposes. See, e.g., Sterling v. Oakland, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962); Poyer v. Boustead, 3 11. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d
838 (1954). Moreover, data may be required in some cases even without arrest or criminal
charge. See Thorn v. New York Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (fingerprinting required for employees of stock exchange firms); Norman v. City of Las Vegas,
64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947) (fingerprinting required for liquor store employees).
These procedures are also held to be necessary as a practical matter to facilitate the
performance of law enforcement functions such as investigation and prosecution. See,
e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Laub Baking Co.,
283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53 (1909); Barletta v.
McFeeley, 107 N.J. Eq. 141, 152 A. 17 (Ch. 1930), afJ'd, 109 N.J. Eq. 241, 156 A. 658 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1931), aff'd, 113 N.J. Eq. 67, 166 A. 144 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
For a survey of the law relating to the authority to take and retain fingerprints, see
A.

MOENssENs, FINGERPRINTS AND THE LAw 39-72, 85-107 (1969).
9 The term "disposition" will be used to signify some terminal point in the prosecu-

tion of a case, such as acquittal, dismissal, charges dropped, no charges brought, or investigation discontinued.
10 For examples indicating the rapid move toward the computerization of arrest files,
STATE IDENTIFICATION & INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, SYsTEM DEvELOPMENT PLAN
CALIFORNIA CRIME TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, PROjECr SEARCH: STANDARDIZED DATA ELEMENTS FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY FILES (1970). Some of the computerization

see NEw YORK

(1967);

projects are making their first attempts to deal with the problems presented by these
records. See, e.g., id.
11 "Arrest record" is a term describing nonconviction arrest data retained after dispo-

sition. It is important to make several distinctions between the arrest record and other
information that is also stored. While facts surrounding a current arrest are technically
part of the record, they should for three reasons be subject to separate consideration by
the courts. First, until a final disposition is reached obviously it is impossible to tell
whether the arrest record is actually an arrest record. Second and more important, the
public has a right to know the basic facts surrounding the arrest in order to prevent
secret arrests and to ensure public supervision of the police. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Third, any dissemination or publication
of present arrest facts, as long as they are true, is probably constitutionally privileged.
See, e.g., Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
Another part of criminal identification files is current investigative data, which are and
should be restricted in order to protect current police investigations and informants.
See note 63 infra. After an investigation has terminated without arrest, however, such
data retained in files should be subject to the same considerations as are discussed below
concerning arrest records.

Finally, where there is a conviction, the record becomes
use of such records does not involve harm to an innocent
they are beyond the scope of the present analysis. For
problems raised by conviction records, see Gough, The

a true criminal record. Because
or potentially innocent person,
an excellent discussion of the
Expungement of Adjudication

Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147.
See also National Council on Crime & Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of Crime:
A Model Act, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 97 (1962).
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disseminated and used without restriction both within and without
the criminal justice system.12 To anyone desiring to determine the extent of a person's past involvement with law enforcement authorities,
the arrest record is extremely important: it is the only way to obtain
this information efficiently and inexpensively through identification of
the person by name alone.' 3
Widespread use of the arrest record, however, can inflict definite
and demonstrable harms on the arrested individual. Inside the criminal
justice system, he may be subjected to unfair treatment by police, prosecutors, and courts; 14 outside the system, he may suffer damage to his
reputation and to his economic and psychological well-being. 15 It is
questionable whether any such consequences should be permitted to
occur to a person who has not been judged guilty but who is presumed
innocent. Until recently, most courts have neglected the problem; in
the absence of legislative action they have left decisions concerning the
retention, dissemination, and use of these records entirely to police
discretion.' 6 But there is a current effort to reexamine the problem
with a view toward eliminating some of the adverse consequences of
arrest records. On one level, some state legislatures have enacted statutes providing for return or expungement of a record when certain
criteria are met.' 7 Unfortunately, these statutes exist only in a few
states. Furthermore, they are limited in effect, they have varying criteria for expungement, they usually do not apply to local identification
bureaus, they seldom contain provisions for return of records disseminated beyond these bureaus, they rarely contain enforcement provisions, and they do not apply to the FBI, the largest collector of arrest
records. In the absence of expungement statutes a few courts, as in
Menard, have recognized the need to restrict the scope of the police
12 See, e.g., A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 34-35 (1971); CoMrrMTE TO INVEmSGATE THE
EFFECTS OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE DisTcr OF COLUMBIA, RE-

PORT 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DUNCAN REPORT]; Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls
Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CoNTEmP. PGOB.
342, 365-66 (1966).
13 But see text at note 126 infra.
14 See text and notes at notes 24-31 infra.
15 See text and notes at notes 76-81 infra.
16 See text and notes 20 & 70 infra.
17 Expungement statutes as of 1966 are listed and analyzed in detail in Gough, supra
note 11, at 162-68, 174-78. Since 1966 several states have added their own acts. See, e.g.,
ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-5 (1970). See generally Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal
or Juvenile Record, 40 CALIF. ST. BJ. 816 (1965); Booth, The Expungement Myth, 38 LA.
BAR BULL. 161 (1963); Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement from the General Public Access, 3 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 121 (1967); Comment, Guilt
by Record, 1 CAL. WsT L. REv. 126 (1965). The term "expungement," it should be noted,
is really a misnomer; most of the statutes cited provide for return or sealing of records
rather than their destruction.
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discretion in light of the debilitating effects on the individual resulting
from the widespread use of his arrest record. This comment will analyze the judicial response to the problems raised by (1) retention and
use of adult'18 nonconviction arrest records within the criminal justice

system, and (2) dissemination of these records at police discretion outside the system. In addition, it will offer suggestions, focusing primarily
on the common law, 19 for the further development of judicial responsibility in this area.
I.

RETENTION AND USE OF ARREST RECORDS WITHIN THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A.

Retention: the "Usefulness" Doctrine

Most courts have been extremely hesitant to interfere with police
discretion. In the absence of legislative action, they declare that all arrest records can be retained and exchanged freely within the criminal
justice system. 20 However, specific reasons for this position are rarely
articulated. 2 ' The proposition generally adopted is that retention of
arrest records is justified by their potential future usefulness in help22
ing police prevent crimes and apprehend criminals.
18 The problems raised by juvenile records are equally significant. See, e.g., In re Smith,
810 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Family Ct. 1970). See generally PaREswrc's COMm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
& ADMINISMATION OF JUSTICE supra note 5, at 44, 74 (1967). However, because of the
special status of juvenile records, they should be the subject of separate consideration
and are not included specifically in this analysis. See Gough, supra note 11, at 168-78. See
also S. RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, 145-63 (1961).
19 Many of the issues presented may have a constitutional dimension. Thus far, however, there has been no specific judicial discussion of any of the possible constitutional
issues. But see notes 46, 50, 110, & 129 infra.
20 Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); Sterling v.
Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962); Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d 265,
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 259 A.2d 663 (Super. Ct. Del. 1969); Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); People v. Lewerenz, 42 Ill. App. 2d 410, 192 N.E.2d 401 (1963);
Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43,
75 N.E.2d 548 (1947); State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 834, rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1948); Coppock v. Reed, 189
Iowa, 581, 178 N.W. 382 (1920); Miller v. Gillespie, 196 Mich. 423, 163 N.W. 22 (1917);
Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 89 A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944); Statman v. Kelly, 47 Misc. 2d
294, 262 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Weisberg v. Police Dep't, 46 Misc. 2d 846, 260 N.Y.S.
2d 554 (Sup. Ct. 1965). See also Village of Homewood v. Dauber, 85 111. App. 2d 127,
229 N.E.2d 804 (1967); In re Molineux, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (1904); People ex rel.
Joyce v. New York, 27 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y.S. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Hansson v. Harris, 252
S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
Cf. Note, 27 Temple L.Q. 441 (1954).
21 One court did explain that retention was necessary in order to furnish superior
police officials with definite and authoritative data concerning the activities of the department. Miller v. Gillespie, 196 Mich. 423, 163 N.W. 22 (1917). However, after disposition of the case, purely statistical data should be sufficient for this purpose.
22 See, e.g., Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); Fernicola v.
Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944).
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Practical considerations support this broad rationale in most cases. 23
Neutral identification information contained in the records, such as
fingerprints and photographs, can be quite helpful to local police if
the individual is ever under investigation again. Positive identification
is often essential to link a suspect to a crime or to protect a person who
is innocent. Also, imputational information such as the arrest notation
can indicate a pattern of conduct that may be the basis for a future arrest or for a decision to press charges. If a rearrest is made, the arrest
record may furnish facts concerning prior conduct which, although not
sufficient to warrant conviction in the previous case, may still be useful
to trained interpreters of records.
Presently, law enforcement officers utilize the record in subjecting
the individual to rearrest on the basis of past arrests 24 and in deciding
whether to bring formal charges. 25 Prosecutors consider past arrests in
determining the category of offense to be charged and in deciding
whether to plea bargain. 26 Courts use the record in denying release prior
to trial or appeal,2 7 in setting bail 8 in determining whether a defendant's testimony is impeached by prior convictions, 29 and in sentencing.30 Parole boards evaluate the record in deciding whether to grant
parole.3 '
While each of these law enforcement uses may be questioned, police,
prosecutors, and courts in every jurisdiction have an equal need for
this data. Free interchange of arrest records facilitates these functions. Although injury to innocent persons may result from retention
and use of the records, this risk is outweighed in most cases by society's interest in the performance of these activities to protect the
general public.
B. Retention or Return: A Reexamination
1. Retention of an Arrest Record Without Probable Cause. The
Menard court did not decide whether further retention and use of the
23 It should be noted that usefulness of arrest records remains unproven since the
closed system maintained by police impairs the ability to document usefulness. Therefore, only potential uses are considered here.
24 W. LA FARE, ARREsr 287-88 (1965).
215 Id. at 141.
26 See D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL 116 (1966) (lack of a "criminal record" often a reason for charge reduction).

27 See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Rhodes v.
United States, 275 F.2d 78, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1960).
28 Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
29 See, e.g., Suggs v. United States, 407 F.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
30 See, e.g., Powell v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 1, 229 P.2d 230 (1951); Murphy v. State, 184
Md. 70, 40 A.2d 239 (1944).
31 See DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 16.
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arrest record within the criminal justice system would be justified if
32
Menard actually were -arrested without probable cause. An examination of the nature of a record of arrest without probable cause in light
of the common law rationale for retention of arrest records may suggest an answer.
The core of the arrest record is the notation of arrest. This notation
either memorializes the arresting officer's perception connecting the
arrested person with a particular crime or signifies a connection based
upon a warrant. For the arrest to be legal, the connection with the
crime must be reasonable or the warrant must be based on probable
cause.3 3 The arrest notation thus becomes the basis for a continuing
inference by law enforcement officials that there were reasonable
grounds at the time of the arrest for associating the arrested person
with the crime. When an arrest is made without probable cause, however, the arresting officer's perception is by definition unreasonable
and the continuing inference based on his perception is invalid; the
arrest notation thus will not be useful. Furthermore, retention may
unjustifiably injure the individual by subjecting him to law enforcement decisions based on the misleading record.3 4 To require the notation to be completed or changed to "detention only" would not
eliminate these possibilities since even a police user might overlook
such a qualification or regard it as a mere formality.
. Of course, such neutral identification data as fingerprints and photographs are still accurate and will be at least as useful as the same data
of a person who has never been arrested. However, when they are
stored and used in conjunction with the misleading arrest notation,
these data lose their neutrality and the same unjustified consequences
flow from their use. To prevent these results, the courts could either require that the arrest notation be removed and that the neutral identification information be kept in completely separate files, or order
'returnof all records relating to the unjustified arrest. If the first alternative were administratively infeasible, return of the entire arrest
record would be warranted.85
2. Retention in Other Cases. The above analysis applies not only
to an arrest made without probable cause, but also to several other
32 As Judge Bazelon pointed out, in Menard probable cause was not demonstrated.
430 F.2d at 492 n.28. There, the'plaintiff had challenged the FBI's statutory authority
to retain his record as a "criminal record." Id. at 489. Although the court dismissed this
claim, the FBI's statutory authority should be interpreted on the basis of the common
law purpose for retaining arrest records, as is discussed below.
s LaFave; supra note 24, at 17-82.
34 Contra, Sterling v. Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
35 See Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969). But cf. Herschel v.
Dyra, 865 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966).
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situations. If an arrest is made with probable cause and it is later discovered that the arrest was based on mistaken identity or that no crime
had occurred,36 the validity of the inference based on the arrest notation is destroyed. For the same reason applicable to an arrest without
37
probable cause, retention is unjustified and return is warranted.
On the other hand, this analysis does not apply directly to harassment
arrest cases. In such cases the arrest is usually made with probable cause
and nothing happens later to vitiate the continuing inference; the arrest record satisfies the usefulness criterion. Nevertheless, the motivation for a harassment arrest is unlawful and unrelated to the grounds
for the arrest. The equitable notion of placing the individual who has
been subject to abuse of police authority in status quo ante outweighs
any usefulness that might result from retaining the records, and return is warranted. 38 Indeed, in light of the willingness of the criminal
justice system to let a potential criminal go unprosecuted as a means
of deterring this type of police abuse, retention of arrest records in
harassment cases would be anomalous.
Finally, it might be thought that a disposition of acquittal, dismissal,
charges dropped, or no charges brought would itself be sufficient to
justify return. If the law were consistent with the presumption of innocence, no disabilities would be permitted to occur without conviction and all records of arrests not resulting in conviction would be
destroyed. With few exceptions,3 9 however, the only effect the courts
have given the presumption of innocence is as a burden of proof. 40
Moreover, these dispositions do not necessarily controvert the usefulness of the record. Acquittal means only that the defendant was not
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Other dispositions can result from the death of an only witness, prosecutorial discretion, or the
illegal seizure of evidence. Because of these considerations, the simple
fact that a person has not been found guilty should not be sufficient to
compel return of the record. If, however, an individual can show that
the potential harm to him outweighs the usefulness of the record to
4
the criminal justice system, he should be able to require return. '
Otherwise, this decision should be left to police discretion.
386This also may have been the case in Menard. 430 F.2d at 488.
37 United States v. Jones, Crim. No. 36388-69 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., April, 1970) (return

required of all records after dismissal because of mistaken identity).
38 Several courts have required return in harassment arrest cases for this very reason.
United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp.
935 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
39 See, e.g., Gow v. Bingham, 57 Misc. 66, 107 N.Y.S. 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
40 See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 269 Minn. 843, 130 N.W.2d 623 (1964).
41 If data were available, it might be possible to use the "future usefulness" analysis
to decide whether arrest records for certain types of crimes, such as disorderly conduct,
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Even when the record should be retained, Menard raises the subsidiary question of whether law enforcement officials are under a duty to
complete the record.42 Because of the possibility of misinterpretation
resulting in unjustifiable injury, retention of the record should be permitted only if the arrest notation and any subsequent notations of the
processing of the individual through the criminal justice system-especially the final disposition-were both complete and accurate. 43
C. Legal Foundationfor Requiring Return
Several legal theories may compel the return of arrest records that
are not useful to police. In Menard, Judge Bazelon suggested that if
an arrest is without probable cause, it is doubtful whether the Constitution can tolerate "any adverse use of that information." 44 Indeed,
one might argue that because the arrest was in violation of the fourth
amendment, all "fruits" of that arrest should be eliminated.45 While
this argument is compelling, the courts have hesitated to extend the
application of the fourth amendment beyond the exclusion from trial
4
of illegally seized evidence.

Although most courts have not yet accepted the principle that retendon and use of arrest records constitutes a common law invasion
of privacy, 47 this right, when examined in the context of the previous
should be returned after disposition. Statistics might prove that notation of certain
crimes serves little or no usefulness in crime prevention. The probability of adverse consequences could be weighed against future usefulness of neutral identification data in
deciding whether retention after disposition is justified. Without empirical data, however,
discretion to maintain records must remain with the police.
42 Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
43 For an excellent discussion of the problem of accuracy of records in general, see
Karst, supra note 12, at 353-59.
44 Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Case Comment, 46
NoTRE DAmE LAW. 825 (1971).
45 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Smith v. United
States, 344 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
46 In Menard, Judge Bazelon cited Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), for the
proposition that the Constitution might not tolerate "any adverse use" of the arrest
record. 430 F.2d at 491. The Supreme Court in Davis intimated that although fingerprints taken pursuant to an arrest without probable cause are inadmissible in a state
court trial, detention for fingerprinting may under certain circumstances comply with
the fourth amendment even without probable cause in the traditional sense. 394 U.S. at
727. Applying fourth amendment considerations to use of the entire record would present a different case because use of the misleading arrest notation would be involved.
However, Davis appears to suggest that there may be limits to the Supreme Court's
willingness to extend the fourth amendment.
47 See cases cited note 20 supra.See also Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 203, 276 (1970). In rejecting
invasion of privacy contentions in these cases, the courts have concluded that any invasion of privacy involved in retaining and using records is outweighed by the interest of
society in having the police perform these functions. See, e.g., Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 In.
App. 2d 81, 91, 142 N.E.2d 818, 824 (1957), in which the court held that Chicago police
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analysis, affords a basis for requiring return in all cases discussed above.
An unreasonable intrusion into an individual's private affairs is commonly considered to be an invasion of his right of privacy. 48 When an
arrest without probable cause occurs, the initial intrusion is unreasonable. Retention and use of the arrest record would seem to be a part
of that initial unreasonable intrusion and therefore unjustified. In
cases of mistaken identity, on the other hand, the initial intrusion is
reasonable. Discovery of the fact of mistaken identity, however, indicates that retention can serve no valid purpose and would constitute a
new intrusion into private affairs.
Several problems still remain regarding a return requirement based
on the right of privacy. While the right is widely held to exist at common law, it is not recognized in several states.49 In some instances it
has been found to be either an implied constitutional right or a natural law right incorporated into the Constitution. The actual application of the constitutional right of privacy, however, has been limited
to special situations, such as intrusion into an individual's intimate
marital life. 50 Finally, the types of actions that constitute an invasion
of privacy are the subject of great debate. 51 In many cases privacy aphad the right to retain the plaintiffs' records after acquittal or dropping of charges,
declaring that "[t]he rights of the individual must be subordinate to the safety of the
public." See also Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 S.2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Village of
Homewood v. Dauber, 85 Ill. App. 2d 127, 229 N.E.2d 304 (1967); People v. Lewerenz,
42 Ill. App. 2d 410, 192 NE.2d 401 (1963); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548
(1947). But see United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967) (return of record
required on privacy grounds after unsuccessful assertion of a constitutional right).
48 The concept of privacy was early recognized in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HAv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Since its publication the right has grown far beyond
the authors' original conceptions. Prosser has organized the actions presently constituting
invasion of privacy into four categories: (1) intrusion into the plaintiff's private affairs,
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff, (3) publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and (4) appropriation for defendant's advantage of plaintiff's name or likeness. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. RaV. 383
(1960).
49 See Prosser, supra note 48, at 388.
50 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a
Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the marital right of privacy,
which falls within the penumbra of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.
The case has given rise to much speculation about the scope of the constitutional right
of privacy. See Comment, Privacy after Griswold-Constitutionalor Natural Law Right?
60 Nw. U.L. Rv. 813 (1966); cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). In
United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio 1968), in which the defendants in a federal criminal antitrust prosecution moved for a protective order relieving them from being photographed and fingerprinted by a federal marshal, the court,
limiting Griswold to marital privacy, rejected the theory that a constitutional right is
violated by the taking or retention of such records. Cf. Note, Discrimination on the Basis
of Arrest Records, 56 Co.muLr L. Rv. 470 (1971).
51 One commentator insists that privacy is not easily categorized and, indeed, that it
is virtually impossible to describe the component parts of the tort. Kalven, Privacy in
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pears to be no more than a label determined by a balancing process in
which a variety of personal interests are weighed against the need of
society or of other individuals to intrude on those interests.5 2 Nevertheless, the magnitude of the individual's interests would seem to justify application of this right here.
Even if the privacy rationale were not adopted, return might be obtained in the cases previously discussed on the grounds that retention
is outside police authority and that the individual has substantial interests that need protection. 53 The traditional equity powers of a civil
court in a new proceeding, or of a criminal court upon disposition of
the case before it, 54 should be sufficient to protect the individual from
the threat of unjustified injury which would result from use of a record and to place him in status quo ante. Several arrest records have actually been ordered returned on this basis. 55
D.

Effects of Requiring Return in These Cases

Return of a record of an arrest made without probable cause or of
a record in which the continuing inference is for some other reason
invalid prohibits all further use of that record in law enforcement decisions. The return of only those records which are inherently.misleading might be preferable to the return or sealing of all records, as
provided in expungement statutes, since records of valid arrests may
still be useful to police. 56 Another advantage over expungement statutes is that return could be required from all criminal identification
bureaus.
Some of the problems inherent in expungement statutes also plague
a common law solution. 57 First, placing the burden on the individual
Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CoNTErt'. PROn. 326 (1966). See
generally S. HOFSTADTER & G. HoRowITz, TaE RIoGrr OF PRiVACY (1964); A. Wtsrm, PmvAcy AND FREDom (1967); Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 253 (1966); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 962 (1964).
52 See note 47 supra.
53 In a case like Menard, if the plaintiff can prove an immediate threat of irreparable
injury due to retention of his arrest record, he may have standing to assert that his record
should be returned simply because retention is action outside the scope of law enforcement agencies' statutory or common law authority. The Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. II, 1967), it has been argued, confers standing on individuals for
judicial review of agency action, except as by law committed to agency discretion, which
adversely affects them in fact. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REV.
450 (1970). See also 3 K.C. DAvis, ADMINST ATrvE LAW TREATISE § 22.01, at 210 (1965, Supp.
1970).
54 See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
55 See cases cited notes 37 & 38 supra.
56 But see text at notes 60 & 125 infra.
57 For a discussion of the difficulties faced in expungement statutes, see articles cited
note 17 supra.
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to initiate action functionally hampers his ability to vindicate his
rights. Second, return is dependent on judicial action; an administrative remedy would be more efficient and less expensive. Third, the
ability of police accurately to dispose of a matter by a complete record
is sacrificed when the record is returned.5 8 Fourth, although the return
of a record from local files provides a partial remedy by precluding
continued reference to that record, future use is not eliminated unless
duplicate records sent to other law enforcement bureaus are also returned. Since copies of the record are forwarded to individuals and
agencies throughout the nation, it is often impossible to identify everyone who has a copy. Moreover, it is difficult for a court to obtain jurisdiction over an outside law enforcement agency known to have a copy.5"
A partial solution to this problem might be to include a provision in the
injunctive order requiring the original disseminating party to be responsible for return of records sent outside the jurisdiction. Although
proving continued retention in violation of the order would be difficult, the individual might be able to enforce compliance by initiating
either a civil contempt proceeding or an action in tort for damages. 60
A final point that must be made is that minimization of unfairness
to those whose records are retained is entirely dependent on limiting
the scope of dissemination and the range of use outside the criminal
justice system. If this proves administratively impractical, the balancing of usefulness against harm to the individual will have to be recalculated.
II.

DISSEMINATION OF ARREST RECORDS OUTSIDE THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
For the large majority of individuals whose arrest records are retained and for whom continuing inferences concerning the arrest are
valid, difficult problems largely unresolved by the courts still exist. As
dissemination of arrest records expands beyond the criminal justice
system, the number of people who have access to records, the uses that
are made of them, and their consequent adverse effects on individuals
multiply dramatically. Before determining whether police discretion
in this area should be limited, however, the present legal status of access to and dissemination of arrest records should be examined.
58 Return of records should be favored over their destruction because the individual
will have the record if some matter arises later for which it is needed.
59 See, e.g., Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d 265 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 259 A.2d 663 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1969), in which the plaintiff requested an order requiring local police to obtain and
return all copies of an arrest record they had sent to the FBI; cf. Roesch v. Ferber, 45
NJ. Super. 149, 131 A.2d 807, rev'd on other grounds, 48 N.J. Super. 231, 137 A.2d 61
(1957).
6O See text and notes at notes 117-121 infra, discussing similar enforcement remedies.
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The PresentPractice,

Public record statutes and information acts generally provide that
records whose retention is required by law shall be open to reasonable
public inspection.6 ' However, police investigative files compiled and

preserved for law enforcement purposes are usually excluded. 62 Even
where statutes do not specifically exempt police records, courts have
held such records confidential to protect current police investigations
and persons submitting information to police.6 3 Arrest records are in64
cluded under this public policy umbrella of confidentiality.
Classification of arrest records as confidential means in practice that
although arrest records are not subject to public inspection, police can
disseminate the records to virtually anyone at their discretion. 5 Dissemination of FBI records is allowed by statute to "authorized officials,"' 66 but a regulation of the Attorney General sets forth a rather
broad list of authorized recipients, including governmental agencies
67
in general, railroad police, insurance companies, and most banks.
61 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1967); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.

§

113-2-1 (1963); IND. ANN.

STAT. § 57-601 (Supp. 1970); N.J. REv. STAT. § 47:1A-2 (Supp. 1971). See generally H. CROSS,
THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953).
62 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (1967); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 625-4(f); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(b)(i) (Supp. 1969).
63 See United States v. Mackey, 36 F.R.D. 431 (D.D.C.), aft'd, 351 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.

1965); People v. Pearson, 111 Cal. App. 2d 9, 244 P.2d 35 (1952); Runyan v. Board of
Prison Terms & Paroles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 183, 79 P.2d 101 (1938); Lee v. Beach Publishing Co. 127 Fla. 600, 173 So. 440 (1937); State v. Mattio, 212 La. 283, 31 So. 2d 801, cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 818 (1947); State v. Dallao, 187 La. 391, 175 So. 4 (1937); Whittle v.
Munshower, 221 Md. 258, 155 A.2d 670 (1959); Hale v. City of New York, 251 App. Div.
826, 296 N.Y.S. 443 (1937); Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nassau County Fire Marshal, 55
Misc. 2d 951, 287 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1967); People v. Carro, 199 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Oneida
County Ct. 1960). But see Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So.
739 (1941); Scott v. County of Nassau, 23 Misc. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
In re Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953); Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510,
153 N.W.2d 501 (1967); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 32 Wis. 2d 11, 144 N.W.2d 793
(1966). See also Cross, supra note 61, at 95-121.
64 Whittle v. Munshower, 221 Md. 258, 155 A.2d 670 (1959); cf. United States v. Mackey,
36 F.R.D. 431 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 351 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Lee v. Beach Publishing Co.
127 Fla. 600, 173 So. 440 (1937). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 88513 (1968); ILL. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-3 (Supp. 1970); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1631 (1964); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 88B, § 10 (1957); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 181.540 (Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 72.50.140 (Supp. 1970).
65 See notes 12 supra & 79 infra.
66 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
67 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1970). Compare United States v. Kelly 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932),
the leading case authorizing federal agents to take fingerprints, in which the court dedared, "It should be added that all United States attorneys and marshals are instructed
by the Attorney General not to make public photographs, Bertillon measurements or
fingerprints prior to trial, except when the prisoner becomes a fugitive from justice, and
are required to destroy or to surrender to the defendant all such records after acquittal
or when the prisoner is finally discharged without conviction. There is therefore as care-
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Several state statutes explicitly authorize dissemination to all governmental agencies. 68 Although some statutes attempt to limit dissemination by state agencies, 69 most do not and none apply to local police or
the FBI.
Courts usually refuse to interfere with the police practice of limit-

ing public access to arrest records but circulating the records at their
discretion.7 0 Yet the rationale for this practice-to protect police investigations-obviously should not apply to arrest records after the
investigation has terminated.7 1 Although no other reason has been
given for the present practice, it might be explained by two other considerations: (1) police should not be exposed to excessive demands for
information, and (2) records include certain investigative data access
to which should be restricted but separation of which would be administratively impractical. The first reason appears trivial because even
where records are public the inquirer must show a specific interest in
the records.7 2 Moreover, police are already under an obligation to furnish other similar information.7 3 The second reason may have some
practical significance, but it should not be controlling as a matter of
law, especially since some courts hold storage of secret information
together with records to be no bar to public inspection.7 4 The present
practice of uncontrolled police discretion should, therefore, be rejected;
ful provision as may be made to prevent the misuse of the records and there is no charge
of any threatened improper use in the present case" (Emphasis added.) In Menard, the
District Court for the District of Columbia has on remand severely restricted the scope of
this regulation. See note 4 supra.
68 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4807 (Supp. 1969); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-712 (1969); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.1 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-29(d) (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 165.83 (Supp. 1971).
69 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 206-3 (Supp. 1970) (information furnished
to "peace officers"); Cf. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 72.50.140 (Supp. 1970), which is unique
in that it allows a cause of action to one whose record is released in violation of the
statute, with recovery of damages-including injury to reputation-caused thereby. The
major failure of other statutes which attempt to provide for confidentiality is their total
lack of enforcement provisions.
70 Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill.
App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957); Poyer v. Boustead, 3
Ill. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954); State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153
S.W.2d 834 (1941); Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (rex. Civ. App. 1952); see Marby v.
Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746, aff'd, 92 Ark. 81, 122 S.W. 115 (1909); People ex rel.
Joyce v. York, 27 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y.S. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1899); cf. State ex Tel. Burns v. Clausmeier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N.E. 541 (1900). See also McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J. Eq.
341, 54 A.2d 469 (Ch. 1947); Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
71 Cf. Scott v. County of Nassau, 23 Misc. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
72 See, e.g., Moore v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 76 NJ. Super. 396, 184 A.2d 748,
modified, 39 NJ. 26, 186 A.2d 676 (1962).
73 See note 11 supra.
74 See, e.g., Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So. 739 (1941).
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either arrest records should be made public or both access and dissemi75
nation should be restricted.
B. Limiting Dissemination
1. The Competing Interests. In deciding whether arrest records
should be made public, several factors become relevant. The individual with an arrest record, of course, has strong interests in limiting
dissemination. First, unrestricted dissemination is likely to damage his
reputation seriously. In some cases the record is either incomplete as
to disposition or inaccurate, 71 thereby increasing the probability that
it will be misinterpreted as evidencing guilt. Even if the record is complete, the reader will often infer that the individual is in some way a
"criminal." Second, the consequences of such dissemination can be
economically disastrous. Licensing boards at all levels usually obtain
copies of the record and consider them in deciding whether to deny or
revoke a license.77 The arrested individual faces difficulties in obtaining insurance, credit, education, and even entry into the armed services. 7 8 Most important, governmental agencies and private groups

with access to records frequently use them to refuse the individual employment.7 9 Finally, and independent of these harms, unrestricted dis75 Presently an individual does not have access to his own arrest record. In view of the
discussion above concerning limited public access, however, there seems to be no good
reason for this practice. See, e.g., Scott v. County of Nassau, 23 Misc. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d
135 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Even if public access were limited, it would seem essential that the
individual and his attorney have unrestricted access to his record for the purpose of
checking accuracy, especially in light of recent federal legislation concerning an individual's access to his own credit files. But see text at note 93 infra.
76 See Miller, supra note 12, at 34, noting that court proceedings following an arrest
are not furnished for about 35% of the "rap sheets" in FBI files. See also INTERNATIONAL
ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, A SURVEY OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 824
(1970), noting that many case reports in the Chicago files were inaccurate or misclassified.
77 DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 14-15.
78 See, e.g., Gough, supra note 11, at 153-57.
79 For evidence of this practice and a discussion of the consequences for the individual,
see DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 9-15; Hess 8- LePoole, Abuse of the Record of
Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIMaE & DELINQ. 494, 498 (1967). One study indicates
that approximately 75% of the New York City area employment agencies sampled do
not refer an applicant with a record, regardless of whether the arrest was followed by
a conviction. E. Sparer, Employability and the Juvenile "Arrest" Record (unpublished
study by the New York University Center for the Study of Unemployed Youth, 1966). In
another study, two-thirds of the employers surveyed would not consider employing a
man acquitted of assault charges. Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10
SoCIAL PROB. 133, 136 (1962). These economic consequences are likely to weigh heaviest
on those who can least bear the burden-the poor and the black. DUNCAN REPORT, supra
note 12, at 7. Moreover, a person may be arrested for a variety of reasons. In Menard,
Judge Bazelon noted that many people are arrested for "investigation," or en masse, or
for harassment purposes with no hope of ultimate conviction. 430 F.2d at 493-94. Police
administrators have even admitted that three out of four arrests are probably illegal.
Hess & LePoole, supra, at 495-96.
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semination of the arrest record disregards the individual's psychological
interest in preventing disclosure of "personal information" without his
consent.8 0 The concepts of intimacy, identity, role-playing, and autonomy all involve the notion that the individual ought to have some
control over what others know about him.81
Militating against the individual's interests are those of police and
the public. First, both police and the public have an interest in dissemination to persons outside the criminal justice system who may help
police prevent crime and apprehend criminals. Second, the public has
an interest in unlimited access in order to minimize business risks by
basing decisions on full disclosure of facts concerning an individual. 2
Since the common law rationale for use of arrest records is premised
on law enforcement purposes, "business risk" interests should not be
determinative unless they are relevant to law enforcement. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the general public is capable of utilizing
arrest records in an intelligent manner to minimize the incidence
of crime. More probably, the presence of an arrest record becomes
a convenient excuse for denying employment. Even if no inference
84
of guilt is drawn,8 3 a businessman may still refuse employment
on the basis of a high probability of rearrest,8 5 an event that would
cost the employer time and money. This rationale may, however,
become a self-fulfilling prophecy: denial of employment because of the
80 Since the person is no longer cast in the public eye, the arrest record might be
considered "personal information" in relation to certain people. See text at notes 108-10

infra.
81 Project-Computerizationof Government Files-What Impact on the Individual? 15
U.C.LA.L. Rv.1371, 1411-1422 (1968).
82 Karst, supra note 12, at 566, suggests that all arrest and criminal records be made
public to end the "corroding, demoralizing occupation of information peddling within
police departments," and that emphasis be placed on legislative proposals restricting
certain uses of this data. Indeed, this alternative may be more consistent with the "free
flow of information." However, any prohibition on use would have the same problems
regarding proof and control as those regarding limitation of dissemination, and there is
evidence that making arrest records public would invite disaster for those with records
if no legislative guidelines were established. For example, in the District of Columbia in
1963 a new policy of almost total public dissemination resulted in a total of more than
3,500 records disseminated a week. DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 15. The overwhelming effects of this practice have already been noted. See note 79 infra. If these practices
are to be curtailed, controls on both dissemination and use seem necessary. See also text

at notes 127-29 infra.
83 As Judge Bazelon noted in Menard, "Even if we assume that the cryptic reference
on appellant's fingerprint card to release 'in accordance with 849(b)(1)' would be under-

stood by police, it is questionable whether it would be understood by potential employers
or the general public." 480 F.2d at 492-93.
84 See PRESIDENT'S COMAI'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION

OF JUsICE, supra

note 5, at 75-76 (1967).
85 An FBI study showed that 92% of those arrested but acquitted or dismissed in 1963

had been rearrested by 1969.
supra note 5, at 38.

FEDERAL BUREAu OF INVEMSGATION,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JusTicE,

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:850

possibility of rearrest can itself become a cause of rearrest.8 6 In this
context the individual's interests, because they are more direct and substantial, should prevail over the interests of the business enterprise.
There are, of course, some instances in which dissemination outside
the criminal justice system promotes crime prevention. For example,
a school board may use an arrest record to deny a job as a school bus
driver to a man repeatedly arrested for drunk driving and child molesting. Selective distribution to such agencies as railroad police or state
licencing boards certainly has greater crime prevention possibilities
than distribution to a credit bureau or private employer. Yet it should
be noted that persons outside the criminal justice system have no particular responsibility to use records for law enforcement purposes.
Their objectives may be unrelated to the police function, and they can
use arrest records for a variety of purposes, a power that carries with it
strong possibility of abuse. Additionally, private individuals or groups
can freely distribute the record once it is given out. While theoretically the question whether to disseminate can be decided fairly by
weighing the probability of crime prevention in each case against that
of potential harm to the individual, the exercise of unfettered discretion by police has so far produced rather unsatisfactory results. The
present widespread dissemination of arrest records seems to indicate
that the interests of the individual are either discounted or disregarded
entirely.
2. A Standard for Limiting Dissemination. Recently, in Morrow v.
District of Columbia,8 7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in an opinion by Judge Wright evaluated some of these considerations. The case sustained the power of the District of Columbia
Court of General Sessions to assume ancillary jurisdiction after dismissal of a criminal case and to issue an order prohibiting dissemination
of the defendant's record. Reversing and remanding for a decision on
the proper scope of restriction on dissemination, the court incorporated
the Duncan Report 8 in an appendix to its opinion.8 9 The Report,
eventually enacted by the District of Columbia, recommended that dissemination of arrest records where there had been no conviction or
86 There is reason to believe that the probability of rearrest is a function of unemployment and that existing rearrest probability figures are based on a high unemployment
population sample. For example, one group noted that in a "spedal study made for the
President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, it appeared that over
50 percent of the offenders studied were unemployed at the time of the crime." National
Capitol Area Civil Liberties Union, The Maintenance and Use of Arrest Records (unpublished report, 1967).
87 417 F 2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
88 Supra note 12.
89 417 F.2d at 745.
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forfeiture of collateral be limited to "law enforcement agents" for "law
enforcement purposes."90 On remand, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals decided that the rules established by the Duncan Report
were sufficient to protect the record in question. 91
This "insider-outsider" standard seems to be the most appropriate
one for restricting access and dissemination in a manner consistent
with the policy previously discussed-it protects the individual while
serving the necessary law enforcement purposes. Since there is latitude
in determining what are law enforcement agencies and purposes, the
rule is sufficiently flexible. Such organizations as licensing boards might
obtain records if they specified reasons and subjected themselves to
rules insuring complete confidentiality. 2 The Duncan Report standard
is also important because it allows access to defense attorneys, who
under present practice frequently obtain records only at the prosecutor's discretion. 93 Furthermore, it would seem essential to allow the
arrested individual access to his own record in order to insure its
completeness and accuracy. However, because employers often require
police clearance as a condition of employment, such a provision may
allow the employer to circumvent normal prohibitions unless measures
are taken to protect the individual from pressure to produce the record.
Additionally, if the record is disseminated to anyone other than law
enforcement agents, notification should be given to the individual
affected; at least then he would be in a position to challenge the decision if he so desired. 94
C.

Limiting Dissemination:Individual Rights and Remedies

1. Rights. Several legal theories are available to a person seeking
to enjoin, or to obtain damages for, the dissemination of his arrest
record to "outsiders." The first arises from the law of privacy and is
90 DUNCAN REPORT, supra note 12, at 23-27.

91 In re Alexander, 259 A.2d 592 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
92 This practice might take care of examples such as that of the school bus driver
since many jobs of public trust nature must be licensed. However, it might also invite

abuse by licensing boards. Inequities would be decreased if the law stringently required,
according to the equal protection clause, a reasonable connection with the arrest and the
denial of the license. Compare cases cited note 129 infra with Pincourt v. Palmer, 190
F.2d 390 (3rd Cir. 1951); Camp v. Brock, 75 Cal. App. 2d 169, 170 P.2d 702 (1946); Hora
v. City & County of San Francisco, 43 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). But see Menard
v. Mitchell, 39 U.S.L.W. 2725 (D.D.C. June 15, 1971) (dissemination to licensing agencies
prohibited).
93 Additionally, records should be available to independent study groups if precautions

are taken to insure confidentiality or anonymity. Greater flexibility in administering the
standard might be insured if records were also available by court order.
94 Morrow also notes that in addition to the Duncan Report standard arrest records in
unusual cases may be returned. 417 F.2d at 741. The above discussion of retention may
provide a guide to these cases.
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exemplified by a case in which a court restrained the display of an
arrested person's photograph in a public "rogues' gallery" after charges
had been dismissed.95 The publication of an "innocent complaintant's
photograph in juxtaposition with hardened criminals" placed the plaintiff in a "false light" in the public eye.96 Since the "false light" privacy
theory is an outgrowth of the law of defamation, it is not surprising to
find libel principles arising in cases of publication of arrest facts and
records. For example, publication in a public "rogues' gallery" of a
photograph of a person who had not been arrested has been held libel
per se. 97 If the fact of arrest is true, of course, publication thereof is not
libelous. 98 Nevertheless, in an analogous context, newspaper publication of a true fact of arrest with additional information which unambiguously conveys to the reader an imputation that the arrested
individual is guilty of a crime has been held libelous as a matter of
law.9 9 Where the article is capable of two interpretations, only one of
which is libelous, the defamation issue has been held to be a question
for the jury. 0 0
These defamation or "false light" privacy cases suggest that at least
two elements must be satisfied to constitute a cause of action: (1) the
information released must have at least one libelous interpretation, and
95 State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755, cert. denied, 333 U.S.
834, rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1946); cf. Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So.
737 (1905); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Downs v. Swann, 111
Md. 53 (1909) (dictum). See also State ex rel Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d
834 (1949).
96 State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 281, 66 N.E.2d 755, 762, cert. denied,
333 U.S. 834, rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1946).
97 Wisher v. City of Centralia, 273 Ill. App. 168 (1933).
98 Compare Rein v. Sun Printing & Publishing Co., 196 App. Div. 873, 188 N.Y.S. 608
(1921), with Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526, 80 N.W. 575 (1899) (false publication charging
guilt); Martin v. Orange County Publications, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 84, 266 N.Y.S.2d 875
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 471, 266 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1965) (false publication charging
arrest). See also Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959); Hanson v. Krehbiel,
68 Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041 (1904).
99 Smith v. New Yorker Staats Zeitung, 154 App. Div. 458, 139 N.Y.S. 325 (1913); Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 111 Vt. 371, 17 A.2d 253 (1941).
100 Commercial Publishing Co. v. Smith, 149 F. 704 (6th Cir. 1907); cf. Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1966); Steward v. World-Wide
Automobiles Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 188, 189 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (congressional committee lumping "innocent" with
"guilty").
Although a privilege is extended to the reporting of official judicial proceedings involving arrest facts, it is a qualified privilege which may be lost if additional facts are
added. Smith v. New Yorker Staats Zeitung, 154 App. Div. 458, 139 N.Y.S. 325 (1913).
Also, a report based on an arrest record is not based on a "public record" and should
not be subject to the public record privilege. See text at notes 82-84 supra. Furthermore,
if the publication imputes guilt it is not privileged even if based on a police report.
Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 111 Vt. 371, 17 A.2d 253 (1941).
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(2) it must be published or made available to the general public. The
former element is easily satisfied where the arrest record is comprised
largely of cryptic notations, or phrased in terminology which would
be of doubtful intelligibility to persons outside the criminal justice
system. 101 In this context, the reader would probably infer guilt rather
than merely the true fact of arrest. Moreover, if the record is incomplete
-for example, if the disposition is lacking-the likelihood that a
reasonable man would infer guilt may be so great that dissemination
10 2
could be restrained.
There may, however, be crippling limitations on use of defamation
and privacy theory. 10 3 Dissemination to a restricted audience may
not be sufficient to qualify as the "publication" required by traditional
privacy doctrine. Furthermore, the courts have declined to entertain
plaintiff suits because of a reluctance to limit police discretion. 10 4 Particularly striking are cases in which courts have refused to sustain invasion of privacy claims where records were made available to employers 0 5
and where arrest photographs were displayed to a large public audience
at a junior high school after charges had been dismissed. 10 6
However, a Maryland case, Carr v. Watkins, 0 7 presents a privacy
concept which may require limitation on dissemination of arrest records
regardless of their defamatory character. While the plaintiff was working for a naval ordnance laboratory, non-criminal charges were made
concerning the suitability of his continued employment, but he was
exonerated after an administrative hearing. Six years later a laboratory
security officer and two police officers transmitted this information,
including particulars of the charges, to the plaintiff's new employer,
realizing that the consequence would be his discharge from employment. The court sustained a cause of action for invasion of privacy,
holding that the officers had unreasonably and seriously interfered with
the plaintiff's interest in not having his affairs disclosed to others. Other
cases similarly recognize this right, requiring only that the subject be a
lol See note 83 supra.

102 If a plaintiff knew his arrest record was inaccurate or incomplete, he might use
these tort theories in conjunction with the analysis at note 43 supra at least to require
completion.
103 For a discussion of possible constitutional limitations on these rights, see note 118
infra.
104 See cases cited note 70 supra. These cases may not be controlling, however, because
usually there had been no allegation or showing that the arrest photographs or records
would be disseminated to parties other than law enforcement agencies.
105 Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947).
106 Hoag v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).

107 177 A.2d 841 (Nd. Ct. App. 1962).
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"private affair" and that the disclosure be "public" and offend a person
of ordinary sensibilities. 0 s
In the context of dissemination of arrest records, a record might be
considered a "private affair." Disclosure of the record to "outsiders"
would constitute an unreasonable interference with a plaintiff's right
not to have his affairs disclosed and would seem to offend a person of
ordinary sensibilities. Although there may not be "public" disclosure,
the breach of a confidential relationship might be sufficient to warrant
redress. 0 9 This type of tortious conduct has been recognized in similar
situations. 110
Finally, even if the privacy rationale is not expanded to reach dissemination cases, a person with an arrest record might be able to invoke
the equity powers of a court"' to limit dissemination because he may
be harmed without any direct countervailing social gain.112 This is
3
precisely what occurred in Morrow."
2. Remedies. An arrested individual might be able to prevent
improper dissemination to "outsiders" by injunctive relief on one of
several grounds. He could request such relief under the "unauthorized
108 See Prosser, supra note 48, at 392-98; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91
(1931); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
109 Redress is often provided against one who breaches a confidential relationship and
divulges privileged communications. Lawyers, physicians, bankers, employers, spouses, and
others have been held liable. J. SHARP, CRErr REPORTING AND PRIVACY 62 (1970). See, e.g.,
Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div.
970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1945); Brex v. Smith, 104 NJ. Eq. 386, 146 A.34 (Ch. 1929). The
difference between the relationship in these cases and the "confidential relationship" between an arrested person and police is that arrest facts are public at the time of arrest.
They do not become confidential until they become part of the arrest record. However,
if the record is truly confidential, there should be a similar duty imposed on an "insider" not to divulge information to persons outside the confidential relationship. But see
Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1956). Moreover,
this invasion of privacy theory is dosely related to the "intrusion" line of privacy cases.
Dissemination to or use by persons not justified in having access may be a new intrusion
into what should be considered "private affairs." See Prosser, id. at 396.
110 See Annot., 165 A.L.R. 1302, 1304-05 (1946).
111 See notes 53-55 supra.
112 Recent developments indicate that a person with an arrest record might have a
constitutional right to have dissemination limited. In a recent case, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 91 S. Ct. 507 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin statute which
allowed the posting of notices in liquor stores declaring plaintiff to be an "excessive
drinker" and forbidding the sale of alcohol to her without prior notification or hearing
was unconstitutional on its face as a denial of due process. For the majority, Justice
Douglas wrote: "Yet certainly where the state attaches a 'badge of infamy' to the citizen,
due process comes into play. . . . Where a person's good name, reputation, honor or
integrity are at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential." Id. at 510. Dissemination of arrest records beyond
law enforcement agencies without notice to the individual does not seem much different.
113 See text at note 87 supra.
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disclosure" privacy rationale of Carr"1 4 or invoke general equitable relief at the conclusion of his criminal trial, as in Morrow,115 or in a new
civil proceeding. The injury resulting from the threat of dissemination
would probably be sufficient to confer standing." 6 Presumably a decree
would be designed to prevent transmission of the record to non-law
enforcement organizations outside the jurisdiction entertaining the
suit. Injunctive relief would, of course, permit use of the contempt
power to insure official cooperation. 117
Where improper dissemination has already occurred, a suit for
damages based on a privacy or libel theory might succeed if the record
were misleading. Even if the record were clear, the Carr rationale suggests a basis for compensation. The possibility of damage recovery
against "insiders" is an important general deterrent to police misconduct in this area and would protect those who were too poor to sue,
who could not prove violations, or who would fail to sue because of
8
potentially insufficient damages."
Aside from these difficulties, however, a plaintiff might be prevented
from suing for damages by the privilege doctrine, which often bars
suits for misconduct by public officials. 119 This doctrine is designed to
insulate public officials from attack so that they may continue in the
"unflinching discharge of their duties."' 20 The privilege is often held
114 See text at notes 107-110 supra.

115 But see Maxwell v. O'Connor, 1 Ill. App. 2d 124, 117 N.E.2d 326 (1953). Aside
from Morrow, the controversy over a criminal court's power to limit dissemination or
require return of an arrest record of the person before the court continues. See United
States v. Penny, Civil No. 34-7270 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 25, 1970).
116 For a more detailed discussion of standing, see note 53 supra.
117 Hearings on compliance with the order are an alternative, but so far they have
met with difficulties. In Morrow, the court held the burden to be on the defendant to
show noncompliance before a hearing will be ordered. 417 F.2d at 744.
118 For a discussion of the general limitations of a damage suit as a means of controlling access and dissemination of files, see Karst, supra note 12, at 350-52. The author
notes that the first amendment privilege may be a constant factor to contend with in any
suit for injunction or damages based on the right to privacy. One requirement for the
privilege is that the matter be of "public interest." Current arrest facts, of course, are
of public interest. Arrest records, excluding present arrest facts, on the other hand, should
be less a matter of public interest for the reasons discussed in the text at notes 82-86
supra. But arrest records of such persons as public officials, who are cast into the public
eye, may warrant separate consideration. See Time v. Pape, 91 S. Ct. 633 (1971); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
119 In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), the Supreme Court held that the acting
director of the federal office of rent stabilization was absolutely privileged in a libel action and that the privilege extended to kindred torts.
120 Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). One reason for the privilege
is related to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the policy of holding individual
officers not liable for actions taken pursuant to their perceived duties. Enactment of indemnity statutes or abolition of the doctrine, which would permit holding liable the
government instead of its officers, might change the nature of the privilege. Recovery
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to be absolute, even where officers have acted willfully and with
malice.' 21 Nevertheless, some cases recognize a qualified privilege and
hold certain public officers liable where they have acted outside the
scope of their authority.122 Dissemination to "outsiders" by an officer in
willful violation of a clear standard would likely be outside the scope
of his authority and there, at least, the privilege doctrine would not
bar a damage action.
It is therefore of primary importance that a standard governing
dissemination be uniform and clearly defined. Otherwise, little protection can be offered the injured plaintiff in most cases. 123 Moreover,
compliance with injunctive orders would certainly be facilitated by a
standard which could be applied by law enforcement agencies without
unnecessary confusion.
The applicable standard could be formulated in a number of ways.
A court could adopt its own principle 24 or request a defendant law
enforcement agency to submit a proposal for judicial approval. Alternatively, a class action would allow a court to adjudicate the rights of
all persons with arrest records in a given jurisdiction. Of course, greater
uniformity would be achieved by adoption of a comprehensive legislative solution or viable administrative rules.
Certainly, the ultimate goal is uniform compliance. In the age of
instant photocopy and national computer data banks, the freedom of
a single party to breach an established standard with impunity could
render imposition of dissemination controls valueless. The creation of
nationwide guidelines limiting dissemination and concomitant establishment of remedies to enforce those guidelines would go far to effectuate uniform compliance.
D.

Limitations of This Approach

The benefit of limiting dissemination to "insiders" is that no decision
could be made by "outsiders" on the basis of the arrest record without
might then be had against the government for damages caused by dissemination to outsiders, creating economic pressure to enforce the standard.
121 See 3 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 53, at § 26.05.
122 See, e.g., Carr v. Watkins, 177 A.2d 841 (Md. Ct. App. 1962).
123 If the standard is breached because of outside monetary persuasions, bribery laws
should be available as a similar deterrent. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1971, at 60, reporting
that a New York City patrolman was indicted for accepting money in exchange for confidential information from police files. Of course, whenever a standard is breached, there
are two guilty parties-the seller and the buyer-and it may be unfair to place all the
burden of honesty on one side. But see text at note 126 infra.
124 In Morrow, the court declared that on remand the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals had full power to adopt an individual case approach, the Duncan Report standard, or its own standard, indicating that a court has full power to articulate a standard
in any case before it.
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first confronting the individual. Unfavorable credit ratings, difficulty
in obtaining insurance, and employment rejections based on data bank
information not supplied by the individual would decrease. However,
even if a uniform standard were adopted and enforced, restricting
dissemination would not completely eliminate "outsider" use. Employment questionnaires regularly ask whether a prospective employee has
been arrested, and there is great pressure on the individual to reveal
everything. 25 On the other hand, since the employer would not have
the official record for verification, the prospective employee could falsify
with impunity. Some leakage would, of course, seem to be inevitable.
If the harm resulting from retention of arrest records is great compared
with their usefulness, expungement remedies may warrant reconsideration; return of arrest records may after all be necessary.
An emerging problem to be confronted is that present judicial
response is aimed only at record keeping within the criminal justice
system. Such organizations as newspapers, which have legitimate access
to initial facts of arrest, can organize this information according to
name, in effect duplicate arrest records, and open the door to circumvention of limits on dissemination. 2 Expansion of the privacy theory
of unreasonable intrusion into private affairs and the ability to sue
"outsiders" might be sufficient to curtail such practices, but direct
limitations on use of arrest records appear necessary to eliminate them
completely.
One court has created a direct limitation on use by enjoining a
company from denying a job to a black man on the basis of numerous
arrests. The court held that since blacks are arrested more often than
whites, such a practice results in racial discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.127 A real problem in such situations is
proving use, but this case suggests that the difficulty is not insurmountable. However, the ruling may be limited in effect since presumably
the company could still deny employment to whites on this basis. The
federal government as an employer has made some attempt to reduce
125 There have been legislative attempts to prohibit employers from asking whether
prospective employees have been arrested, but so far they have met with failure. See Hess
& LePoole, supra note 79, at 499.
126 In fact, this practice may to some extent already exist. See the reference to "dipping agencies" in Note, supra note 50, at 477 (1971).
127 Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970). See generally
Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially Discriminating Employment Criterion, 6 HIAv.
Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LiB. L. Rxv. 165 (1971). The logic of this case, however, probably goes
too far. Males are arrested more often than females; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 also prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex; therefore, denying jobs to men
on the basis of numerous arrests also results in prohibited sexual discrimination. Yet to
deny employment to white females, the only group left, would probably be a denial of
equal protection.
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its use of arrest records by eliminating questions concerning nonconviction arrests from employment questionnaires. 128 Beyond that, the
government may be under a constitutional duty not to use the fact of
an arrest to deny employment or a license unless there is a reasonable
129
connection between the privilege denied and the cause of the arrest.
In order to regulate effectively the use of arrest records by both the
government and private persons, more comprehensive legislation will
probably be necessary.
III.

CONCLUSION

As computerization augments police capacity to gather and store
arrest records, an increasing number of people may obtain access to
and use of such records. Adverse effects on arrested individuals will
increase unless the law develops an effective means of regulating record
keeping. Although comprehensive legislation would have certain advantages, there is both the need and sufficient common law authority
for the development of judicial supervision in this area. Requiring
return of arrest records proven not useful would help eliminate continued reliance on them. Limiting dissemination of unreturned records
to "insiders" would not eliminate all use, but it would allow the
individual with the arrest record to escape, in part, its stigma and
place the legal system one step closer to a true presumption of innocence.
128 PRESIDENT'S .COMr'N

ON

LAW
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supra

note 5, at 75.
129 See, e.g., Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (termination of job as postal clerk because employee living with a woman and not
married unconstitutional because no rational nexus with job); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d
1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (alleged homosexual advance by civil service employee toward another insufficient to justify dismissal).

